That it would be 'rather fine' or 'somewhat shabby' to do something, which it is none the less not a matter of strict obligation to do or avoid, is an idea as common in ordinary ethical discussion as it is ignored by philosophers...
It remains fairly clear always what it would be better or worse to seek to realize, while it is always maddeningly unclear what one is obliged to do.
The obligatory...has a much closer relationship with the undesirable and the evil than with the desirable and or the good. We are obliged to do things mainly because certain grave evils would otherwise befall, and not merely to realize what is positively good (Values and Intentions, p. 21).
What is worthwhile per se or the contray is, of course, something having the closest possible relation to what ought to be done, but nevertheless not so close as to not leave it possible to assert the existence or possibility of worthwhile or unworthwhile things having little or no relation to what ought to be done. The field of ethics presupposes the field of axiology, but the latter, arguably, stretches out beyond the limits of the former (Axiological Ethics, pp. 3-4).
It is of supreme importance that in axiological considerations we should never assume that disvalues are in any sense the mirror-image of values, that the absence of goodness is automatically very bad, or the absence of badness deeply good, etc., or that the principles governing valuation and disvaluation are in any way closely parallel (Axiological Ethics, p. 8).