“The views that Wittgenstein is here putting forward are in many respects profoundly analogous to those of Kant, in that he locates a whole realm of unknowable, simple unities beneath the complex objects which appear before us empirically, and takes it that their relations are in some unknowable manner translated into the relations of empirical things.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 371.
“Wittgenstein, however, like Kant, has his various transcendentals which, in the sort of speech that enables us to state the relations of ordinary empirical objects, cannot be spoken of at all, but which, wince he does in fact speak of them, must be capable of being spoken of in some other manner. Kant’s introduction of what can and must be thought of, but not known, is wholly parallel. The Wittgensteinian subject, or cosmic speaker, is such a transcendental; and so is the whole world conceived as a whole, whether in the abstract guise of ‘everything that is the case’, the totality of the macro-facts or micro-facts that there are.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 373.
“Our freedom and deathlessness lie in another, non-factual dimension altogether. In the same way, the beauty of certain objects, and the excellence and blessedness of a certain way of life, and of the whole world seen in the light of these things, go beyond all the facts of the world, and belong to a mystical stratum that cannot be uttered as empirical facts are utterable. Wittgenstein in all these utterances is providing a close analogue to the practical postulations of Kant. It is an immense pity that those who have commented on the highly metaphysical and mystical Tractatus have, in the main, been deep-dyed barbarians as far as metaphysics and mysticism are concerned.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 374.