“Kant, like Wittgenstein, admits that the notions of transcendent metaphysics have deep roots in our conceptual and linguistic apparatus, but he does not, like Wittgenstein, think that there is some sort of philosophical therapy which could exorcise them.” Kant and the Transcendental Object,p. 200.
“There is a great deal of brash writing in the Critique of Pure Reason, and an exaggerated repudiation of the magnificent metaphysical tradition in which Kant grew up, and which is really always in the background of his thought. But this brash writing has been greatly admired by many, particularly in recent times, and has been given a false importance which a careful study of Kant will dispel.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p 28.
“Unapparent objects behind appearances and experience are..part of the Leibnizian tradition, which as modified by Christian Wolff and his school, provided the true background against which all Kant’s teaching must be understood. To Leibniz, as to Kant, space was only a well-founded phenomenon, the expression of parallelisms and affinities among monadic substances, some apperceptive and rational, some irrationally conscious, and some dizzily confused, which make up the true world. To this view Kant always shows deference: it tells us, he says, what Things-in-themselves would have to be like if we could have any knowledge of them.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 17.
“Without some definite idea of the logical character of what could be independently real, we should not be able to characterize our experienced world as being merely phenomenal.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 24.
“Kant does not…forbid us to retain the conception of a persistent personal self-responsible for all we remember to have done and thought, and whatever we anticipate. The postulation of such a self will, in fact, be shown to be unavoidable from a moral point of view.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 206.