“Kant certainly uses the word ‘knowledge’ eccentrically in holding that what we regard as a necessary condition of a certain sort of knowledge is not itself capable of being known; but for Kant we can never be said to know what we only conceive emptily and without fulfilling intuition. We cannot therefore be said to know that there is a Transcendental Subject or that there are Transcendental Objects, though both are necessary to the existence of empirical knowledge.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 7.
“It is, however, all-important to stress that Kant believes that there absolutely is such a sensitive, perceptive, thinking subject, before which objects display themselves in experience, and that is present and active even when we are much too object-absorbed to be conscious of it, and that there are properties that it has ‘in itself’, with which we are necessarily unacquainted. It may even, as far as we can tell, be the very same being that appears to us as the brain or the nerves in the body (see, e.g., CPR, B 72.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 10.
“We have, Kant holds, some sort of immediate sense of our own spontaneous causality in acts of free choice, particularly in those of moral decision, but the sort of freedom of which we are then conscious is nothing that we can clearly understand (e.g., CPR, B. xxix), and of which he only once or twice dares say that we can have knowledge.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 11.
“Kant’s whole procedure is, therefore, such as to suggest, and at one or two crucial points to assert, a thoroughgoing correlation between the structures of phenomenal givens and those of their transcendent structures.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 15.