“The dialectic is is...primarily a method of persistently reapplied higher-level, or metalogical, or second-order comment…where we …consider the content and operation of a concept from outside as it were, and assess its success in doing whatever it sets out to do” (Hegel's Use of Teleology, Ascent to the Absolute, p. 132).
"Understanding is the beginning of philosophy: only when various mutually complementary, often antithetical abstractions have been clearly developed, will it be possible to integrate them into a richly analyzed , living view" (Hegel: A Re-examination, NY: Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 61).
"According to Hegel, the subject of a philosophical proposition only acquires a definite content as we go on to predicate notions of it in thought, in which process we may find ourselves wanting to distort the normal use of our predicates, and to say, for example, that the Soul is both finite and infinite, or again that it is neither" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p, 62).
"It is...in the Kantian antinomies that Hegel sees the most explicit modern expression of Dialectic. Kant is praised, not only for showing that our notions of time, space, and causal dependence can be developed in contradictory ways, but in showing further that such contradictions are 'essential and necessary', that they do not spring from a casual error or conceptual mistake as previous philosophers had supposed...[Hegel] criticizes Kant for confining the antinomies to a limited set of cosmological ideas: he should, on Hegel's view, have recognized their presence in objects of all types, and in all notions and ideas" (Hegel: A Re-examination, pp. 64-5, referencing Hegel's Lesser Logic, par. 48.)
"Everything in the world is said by Hegel to involve opposed and contradictory aspects: he maintains in fact that contradiction is the motive force of the world, that it is absurd to say that contradictions are unthinkable" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 65, referencing Hegel's Lesser Logic, par 119, Zus. 2).
"The characteristic of Reason or Speculation, as opposed to Dialectic, is that it succeeds in uniting or reconciling opposed characteristics, so that the unalloyed contradiction marking the dialectical stage, which is responsible for its unease, passes over into a state which is also one of harmony and peace...and if Dialectic has shown that concepts so opposed either break down into senselessness or simply pass over into one another--then the function of Reason is to integrate such notions into new unities, where they will be shown to require each other and to be necessary conditions of each other" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 66).
"Hegel does not think that the harmonies of Reason involve any mere rejection of the disharmonies and contradictions of dialectical thought. These disharmonies may be 'overcome' but their overcoming is also their perpetual preservation. For they are overcome only in the sense that they are seen to be necessary conditions of a reasonable result, and so, in a sense, not overcome at all. One may, in fcat, say with some exaggeration, that for Hegel the overcoming of contradictions and irrationality consists really in their permanent acceptance, since they are seen to be essential to, and therefore part of, the final rational outcome. As Hegel himself puts it: 'A speculative content cannot express itself in any one-side proposition. If we say, e.g., that the Absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective, this is indeed the case, but is to this extent one-sided, in that here only the unity is pronounced and stressed, while in actual fact the subjective and the objective are not only identical, but also different.'"(Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 64)...
"Hegel is...deeply opposed to any view which makes the contradictions of Dialectic merely apparent, something that will vanish once Systematic Science has been achieved (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 64)...Hegel further emphasizes that he is not talking about 'contradiction' in some half-hearted or equivocal manner: he is not saying that X is A in one sense, but not A in another, that it is A from one point of view but not from another...Hegel makes it as plain as possible, that it is not some watered-down, equivocal brand of contradiction, but straightforward, head-on contradiction, that he believes to exist in thought and the world, and to be an ineliminable component in self-conscious spiritual reality" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 77).
"We may, however, maintain that, whatever Hegel may say in regard to the presence of contradictions in thought and reality, the sense in which he admits such contradictions is determined by his use of the concept, and not by what he says about it. And since he uses 'contradiction' to illuminate the workings of ordinary notions, and things in the world, and not to cast doubt on their meaning or reality, it is plain that he cannot be using it in the self-cancelling manner that might at first seem plausible. By the presence of 'contradictions' in thought or reality, Hegel plainly means the presence of opposed, antithetical tendencies, tendencies which work in contrary directions, which each aim at dominating the whole field and worsting their opponents, but which each also require these opponents in order to be what they are, and to have something to struggle with" (Hegel: A Re-examination. p. 77).
"Whatever one may think of the detailed application of his Dialectic, (Hegel) has certainly made plain that our notions do carry with them a certain natural shading in other notions, a natural implication of such notions, and a natural favourableness and unfavourableness to other notions, which is not in our power to create or alter, but which may be said to rest solely on their affinity of content" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 79).
"Hegel in fact admits that much of the detail of the world is contingent and dialectically indeducible: he should have gone further , in conformity with his actual practice, and admitted that even its broader features admit of no precise deduction, but merely if an illuminating treatment. We can show, that is, how things and notions can be regarded as making contributions to the self-consciousness of Spirit: we cannot show that the same contributions could not have been made otherwise" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 82).
"We may note...that the notion of Spirit, in which the Dialectic culminates, is such as to forbid that the Dialectic should be anything like a deductive system, in which unique conclusions follow rigorously upon definite premises. For Spirit can only exist as Spirit in so far as it is confronted with an other which it cannot render completely transparent" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 82).
"It seems better to judge Hegel's remarkable performance in the light of the reasonable aims which appear in his practice, than in the light of the unreasonable aims which may be read into his less careful statements by his admirers or his detractors" (Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 82).