“It is also important to stress here that, for Kant, our own thinking selves, as the agents who perform all our perceptual and conceptual syntheses, and who present us with our picture of a coherent, real world, and of whose regular action we are at all times capable of being conscious, are themselves objects of which no intuitive, sensuous presentation is possible, and which are accordingly, in their non-apparent aspects, wholly beyond knowledge (CPR, B. 157-8).” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 2.
“And this unknowable, thinking subject must further be credited, in virtue of certain moral demands...with the power to initiate changes in itself and the world, to which no adequately determining, previously existent causal factor can be assigned. Such a power is not only not illustrated by anything given to sensible intuition: it is also, in Kant’s view, incapable of being thus illustrated.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 3.
“Kant’s account of experience and knowledge therefore presupposes the existence of agents and acts that cannot be empirically known, since they are the preconditions of empirical knowledge, and it also presumes that we can form just notions of such agents and of them.” Kant and the Transcendental Object, p. 5.